Chapter Six
Shiloh
Although the
expedition had been largely intelligence-oriented, it had caused unreasonable
fears in Federal headquarters. Upon returning to Bowling
Green, Cleburne learned that George
Thomas’ advance of 9,000 Federals out of Louisville
had been ordered to return to the city as a result of his foray. Federal General Albin Schoepf also heard of
the unknown force of unknown strength around Jamestown or Tompkinsville. Fearing he would
be flanked, General Schoepf abandoned his move against General Zollicoffer,
ordering his men back to Louisville.
The green troops became panicked on the return trip, scattering in what became
known as ‘the Wild Cat Stampede’.
Following the
expedition, Cleburne took a 48 hour leave of
absence and traveled to Nashville
to buy military clothing for his troops. At the train station , he was
surprised to find a reception awaiting his arrival. The news of his successful
foray had preceded him and the governor and the citizens welcomed him warmly.
In addition to much-needed clothes, the brigade
was re-outfitted with British Enfields, making them one of the best-armed units
in the army. Armed with General Hardee’s Rifle
and Infantry Tactics, Cleburne drilled his
brigade into the winter and aided in the construction of forts on the hills
surrounding Bowling Green.
In January, Cleburne was shocked to hear that
the Secretary of War in Richmond redesigned his
1st Arkansas Regiment as the 15th Arkansas. Cleburne protested by sending the secretary a
letter, stating that his regiment had been the first organized in the state.
Despite this request, the secretary did not re-change the titles.
Disaster soon
struck the Confederates. On January 19, the Confederate’s right flank was
attacked at the Battle of Mill Spring. Fort Henry
was attacked on the 6th of February and taken after a bombardment of two hours.
Now that Fort Henry
had fallen, the danger that Fort
Donaldson could fall was
very real. In the case that Fort
Donaldson also fell,
Federals could travel by gunboats and outflank and destroy the Army of Central
Kentucky. This left the Confederates in a perilous situation. Johnston
decided it would be best to cut his losses and evacuate Bowling
Green and Columbus.
The retreat to Nashville began on
February 11, 1862. Cleburne’s
Brigade, as well as the rest of Hardee’s Division, were ordered to act as rear
guard to the disheartened army. For three days, they destroyed all supplies
that had not been taken with the retreating army. On the 14, as Hardee’s
Division was leaving Bowling Green, Federal artillery shells announced the
arrival of the coming troops. On the march south to Nashville,
Cleburne’s
Brigade was pelted with cold rain and sleet. By February 16, they arrived in Nashville “well worn out
hungry and tired.” (1)
Despite the hope
that Nashville would offer relief, the news
arrived that Fort
Donaldson had fallen.
Inevitably, this meant that Nashville,
unfortified and incapable of being successfully fortified, would have to be
abandoned to the advancing columns from the North. While Cleburne’s
Brigade crowded aboard cold railroad cars that would take them out of Nashville, violent mobs broke
out.
On
February 28, Johnston’s army began their march
to Decatur, Alabama. Johnston’s
plan was for his troops to unite in Corinth,
Mississippi, a strategic rail
center, with the surrounding commands of Beauregard and Bragg in order to
assume the offensive and drive the enemy back North. With this in mind, Johnston ordered General Braxton Bragg and his troops from
New Orleans to occupy Corinth before the Federals could.
Hardee’s
Division retained their role of rear guard during this movement and arranged
for the shipment of four million pounds of meat to Grenada,
Mississippi.
On March 4, 1862, Cleburne
was commissioned brigadier general. This appointment was recommended by the
officers under him, as well as by General Hardee.
On
March 18, Federals began to disembark at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River. The landing was 22 miles from Corinth. The landing was
situated at the foot of a high bluff. A little over 2 miles southeast of here
was a little log church named Shiloh. Owl
Creek ran west of the church and Lick Creek ran to the east. These two creeks,
about 5 miles apart, flowed northeast to the Tennessee. This area that would soon become
a bloody battlefield was covered with dense undergrowth and held ravines as
deep as 50 feet.
By the end of
March, Cleburne’s Brigade arrived in camp at Corinth. His was one of
about 15 brigades, totaling almost 40,000 men, now designated the Army of the Mississippi. With the
new name, came a reorganization. Johnston
divided the troops into four corps: Hardee, Polk, Bragg, and Crittenden (later
replaced by John C. Breckinridge) were the new corps commanders. Cleburne’s Brigade remained in Hardee’s Corps, and his
brigade grew to six regiments: 15th Arkansas,
6th Mississippi, 5th Tennessee (now called the 35th Tennessee) 23rd Tennessee,
24th Tennessee,
and the newly-arrived 2ndTennessee commanded by Colonel William Bate.
Captain I.W. Avery, then commander of
independent Georgia cavalry,
later serving as a staff officer to Cleburne,
recorded seeing the 2nd Brigade as it drilled in Corinth:
The leader was a
plain-looking officer, dressed in faded gray, topped with a weather-beaten
slouched gray hat, riding an ungainly gray steed of peculiar power, the rider
and horse being singularly matched…(2)
Ever since March 18, 1862, Federals had been
disembarking at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River,
pitching their tents on a plateau bound by Owl and Lick Creeks and Shiloh
Branch. Major General Grant commanded the army of five divisions totaling
around 38,000 men; his second-in-command was Sherman, who stretched his camp
across a steep ridge west of the landing, parallel to Shiloh Branch and
terminating near Owl Creek, the distance of a mile. Grant awaited reinforcement
in the arrival of Buell’s 25,000 man army from Nashville,
but Johnston’s plan
was to pounce upon Grant before this could happen.
It was learned
on April 1, that Buell’s army was on the move. Although there was an outside
chance of further reinforcements by 17,000 troops under Van Dorn and Price,
Johnston, in a council of war with his generals, decided that time was of the
essence.
In the early
morning hours of April 3, the Confederate camp at Corinth was awake and preparing to march. Each
man was to carry 5 day’s rations with him, along with 100 rounds of ammunition.
Hardee’s Corps, with Cleburne’s Brigade in
front, would lead the army to the halfway point between Corinth and Pittsburg Landing, Mickey’s
Farmhouse.
Around noon, Cleburne’s Brigade began
the march. However, it was not a promising beginning. Beauregard told Hardee to
have his corps ready by noon. Bragg, however told Hardee to begin “as soon as
practicable.” Although Cleburne
began as scheduled, the rest of Hardee’s Corps did not start until 3pm. Bragg
started late as well, and Polk did not move out until that night. “The result
was that the Army of the Mississippi,
like its namesake, became a meandering river of men flowing sluggishly toward
the Federal force at Pittsburg Landing.” (3)
The day began
clear and bright for Cleburne’s
Brigade as the moved along unobstructed roads. The mood was likewise positive,
especially for the Tennesseans. Upon crossing the boarder, two-thirds of the
brigade cheered. Later that day, as they marched along the Ridge
Road, the rain began to fall. Finally, near dusk Cleburne turned his column
off onto a side road where they bivouacked for the night. The general addressed
each of his regiments with a speech. One of the men in a Tennessee regiment recalled, “Old Pat was an
eloquent talker.”
Gen. Cleburne addressed our regiment, telling us that we were soon to be
engaged in a great battle, and that if we did our duty as good soldiers he was
satisfied we should gain a great victory, and that we should regain Tennessee and be in a
measure restored to our families and homes. He said that we, as Tennesseans,
had more to fight for than he or his own Arkansans, as we were to make the “fight
for our homes and firesides.” (4)
That next
morning, April 4, the brigade was back on the road to Mickey’s Farmhouse.
Before they got very far, they discovered that the road in front of them was
blocked by Polk’s wagons. Evidently, Polk had passed Cleburne’s bivouac during the night and had
camped in the road. After the wagons were moved, the brigade continued.
Meanwhile, Bragg was having troubles of his own. After his late start the
previous day, Bragg discovered that the road he was taking was too narrow for
his wagons. Without asking for permission, Bragg decided to change roads; this
led to even more delays.
After arriving
at Mickey’s, Cleburne’s
men rested under shade trees awaiting orders. Suddenly, the cavalry that had
been screening their advance, came galloping back through the woods. They were
followed by about 150 Federals on horseback. The brigade opened fire just as
the Federals appeared over a hill. An private later wrote, “Our infantry fire
was tremendous to me, and the most intensely exciting thing I had ever heard,
being the first musketry fire at a real enemy that I and most of the army had
ever heard, and the yell that went down the line of infantrymen following
showed their readiness for the fray”. About 12 Federals were killed or wounded.
(5)
The brigade turned
onto the Corinth Road to bivouac as a gentle
rain fell. Cleburne
ordered that no bugles or drums be sounded, as they would alert the enemy;
although he feared that the skirmish had already done this. Colonel George Tithe
Baylor, aide-de-camp to Johnston
wrote:
It has always been a
matter of wonder to me how the Federal army lay in camp all Friday evening near
enough for us to hear their drums beat and fail to discover our proximity,
especially as there were nearly fifty thousand of us (forty-six thousand, I
think), and some of our overly zealous men had brought about a skirmish, in
which they used a field-piece, and captured some prisoners. The Terry Rangers
had fired their guns to load them afresh, greatly to Gen. Johnston's annoyance,
and Col. John A. Wharton was put under arrest for it. That brave officer put in
an earnest appeal to the General, saying he “would rather be shot than not
allowed to go into the fight,” and upon being released did gallant service with
the Terry Rangers in the battle. (6)
That night, the gentle rain turned into a cold
downpour as the generals met for a final meeting in Johnston’s tent, resolving to attack that
next morning.
Before April 5,
1862 dawned, orders were given to move forward at 3am, however this would be impossible
due to the swollen streams. As the brigade assembled for battle, Cleburne reminded them to
remain as silent as possible as they began a cautious advance around 7am. They
continued to advance until they could hear Federal officers shouting commands
to their troops during drill. Regrettably, at that hour Hardee’s Corps were the
only one in position to attack. Bragg and Polk’s troops had become intermingled
on the muddy roads as they approached their positions and Breckinridge’s
reserve Corps arrived late that afternoon.
Finally, by that
night the Confederate’s were in position. The army would be divided into three
lines. Hardee’s Corps would be on the front line. Cleburne’s Brigade, on the Confederate’s far
left, would lead the advance. Bragg’s Corps, 800 yards behind Hardee, was the
second line. Behind Bragg was Polk and Breckinridge. That night, the men settled down for the night with orders to sleep on their arms.
Sleep was difficult on the wet ground on that cool spring night and it added to
the anticipation of what would inevitably happen in the morning.
|
skirmish line
15th Arkansas
|
|
24th Tennessee
|
5th Tennessee
|
6th Mississippi
|
23rd Tennessee
|
Sunday, April 6,
1862 dawned with the sound of Hardee’s skirmishers engaging a reconnaissance
party of the enemy. Before the general advance, Johnston said:
Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi:
I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country. With
the resolution and disciplined valor becoming men fighting, as you are, for all
worth living or dying for, you can but march to a decisive victory over the
agrarian mercenaries sent to despoil you of your liberties, property and honor.
Remember the precious stake involved, remember the dependence of your mothers,
your wives, your sisters and your children on the result. Remember the land: broad
and abounding and the happy homes and the eyes that would be desolated by your
defeat. The eyes and hopes of eight millions of people rest upon you; you are
expected to show yourselves worthy of your race and lineage --- worthy of the
women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in
any time. With such incentives to brave deeds, and with the trust that God is
with us, your general will lead you confidently to the combat---assured of success.
Upon hearing the skirmishers, Cleburne ordered his men
forward and subsequently the other units fell in. Cleburne wrote in his battle report:
On the morning of
the 6th my brigade was formed in line of battle on the left of your division.
It consisted of the following regiments, viz: The Twenty-third Tennessee,
Lieut. Col. James F. Neill commanding; Sixth Mississippi, Col. J. J. Thornton;
Fifth Tennessee, Col. Ben. J. Hill; Twenty-fourth Tennessee, Lieut. Col. Thomas
H. Peebles commanding; Fifteenth Arkansas, Lieut. Col. A. K. Patton commanding,
and the Second Tennessee, Col. W. B. Bate. The regiments were placed in the
following order: Twenty-third Tennessee on the right, Sixth Mississippi next,
Fifth Tennessee next, Twenty-fourth Tennessee on the left, Fifteenth Arkansas
deployed as skirmishers in front of the line, with their reserve near the left,
and the Second Tennessee en échelon 500 yards in rear of my left flank, with a
strong line of skirmishers covering the interval between its left and that of
the Twenty-fourth Tennessee. In this formation, soon after daylight, I advanced
with the division against the enemy, keeping the proper distance from and
regulating my movements by those of General Wood's brigade, which was on my
right. I remained myself near the right of my brigade so as to preserve, as far
as possible, my connection with the division. Trigg's battery followed near the
right of my brigade, but was under the control of the chief of artillery, and
left me after the first encounter. I advanced some distance through the woods
without opposition. The enemy first showed himself about 400 yards off towards
my left flank. I ordered Captain Trigg to send a howitzer in this direction and
wake him up with a few shells. Continuing to move forward, the Fifteenth
Arkansas engaged the enemy's skirmishers and drove them in on their first line
of battle. My skirmishers then fell back on their reserve. I was soon in
sight of the enemy's encampments, behind the first of which he had formed his
line of battle. He was very advantageously posted and overlapped my left flank
by at least half a brigade. His line was lying down behind the rising ground on
which his tents were pitched, and opposite my right he had made a breastwork of
logs and bales of hay. Everywhere his musketry and artillery at short range
swept the open spaces between the tents in his front with an iron storm that
threatened certain destruction to every living thing that would dare to cross
them.
The
Federals were in a strong position. Sherman’s
men were in battle lines on a rise of ground that was 200 yards north of a deep
marsh. The marsh was brought on by the heavy rains which had filled Shiloh branch till it overflowed into the surrounding
lowlands. Now, this river that had not even been on the map poised itself to be
a great danger to Cleburne’s
Brigade. (7)
Cleburne refused to let this marsh defeat
him. He spurred his horse forward into the tangle of brush and mud. The horse
panicked when its hooves began to sink in the mire. In Cleburne’s
words, “My own horse bogged down in it and threw me, and it was with great difficulty I got out.” The marsh pushed a wedge into Cleburne’s line. The 2nd,
5th, and 24th Tennessee as well as the 15th Arkansas moved to the left of the marsh. The
6th Mississippi and
the 23rd Tennessee
moved to the right of the marsh. (8)
Earlier, Confederate Captain
John Trigg’s battery had been forced to relocate. It had been shelling the 53rd’s
position, but had been doing little good. The Federal artillery were better
sited and were hitting him from several points. Cleburne wrote that, “I had no artillery
under my command from this time forward.” The brigade was separated by a swamp,
was without artillery support, and was expected to push back an enemy larger
than their own who were heavily entrenched. (9)
Despite these setbacks, Cleburne
moved forward with the 6th Mississippi and the
23rd Tennessee.
They advanced out of the woods and into
an open field. From here, the 53rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s camp could be seen. Cleburne dismounted, drew his sword and led
the men in a charge. The attack caught the breakfasting Federals by surprise
and they scrambled to the top of the barricade of
logs and bales of hay; back to the protection of the eight 20-pound rifled
pieces, and four 12-pound Napoleon guns. Robert D. Smith, ordinance sergeant of the
2nd Tennessee,
which was to the left of the marsh,
recalled their charge:
Immediately a brigade of the enemy rose as
one man about 30 yards in front of us from ambush and poured a most a most terrific
fire upon us from their Enfield Rifles—this was the first we saw of the enemy
and…we found ourselves in rather a critical position. Our skirmishers fired two
rounds, then we brought them out safe, falling back in the regt. Col. Bate saw
that in order to prevent the regt. from being
all killed or captured, he must make a desperate charge. He led the charge with
great gallantry—but the enemy poured such destructive fire into our ranks that
we were unable to stand it.
Cleburne wrote: “Under the terrible fire much confusion followed, and a quick
and bloody repulse was the consequence.” (10)
As the men rallied in the woods, Cleburne could hear the
Rebel yell resounding off the trees and mixing with the roar of battle. To his
immediate right, Wood’s Brigade was now fully engaging the enemy. To halt the
advance now would mean the destruction of Wood’s Brigade, for they would have
twice the amount of men to engage, not to mention destructive cross-fire from
enemy cannon. J. A. Wheeler, member of the 23rd Tennessee,
recalled the second charge which they and the 6th Mississippi made:
General Cleburne
came to us again and said, “Boys, don't be discouraged, that is not the first
charge that was ever repulsed, fix bayonets and give them steel.” Then he
ordered, “Forward! Charge!” We leaped forward with a deafening cheer and drove
the infantry out of the ravine, but firing from the battery and a line of
infantry was so heavy just in rear of the battery that we again fell back, with
great loss, but soon reformed… (11)
Cleburne wrote, “Again and again the Sixth
Mississippi, unaided, charged the enemy's line, and it was only when the
regiment had lost 300 officers and men killed and wounded, out of an aggregate
of 425, that it yielded and retreated in disorder over its own dead and dying.
Colonel Thornton and Major Lowry, the field officers, were both wounded. It
would be useless to enlarge on the courage and devotion of the Sixth
Mississippi. The facts as recorded speak louder than any words of mine.”
Amazingly, he was not injured during the charges. (12)
While the remnants of the two
regiments were rallying, Cleburne
mounted his horse and rode around the swamp to the rest of his brigade. Shortly
after the brigade had split up, the 15th Arkansas,
and the 5th and 24th Tennessee
had been able to fire first on a Federal division. The enemy,
outnumbering the Confederates, had been able to flank them on the left and Cleburne found them
“terribly cut up.” The reserve regiment, the 2nd Tennessee charged on the left despite “a
murderous crossfire” from both the entrenched and flanking Federals. Cleburne was glad to find
that his men had “driven [the enemy] back at all points, and was now in
possession of his first line of encampments”, though, as Robert D. Smith
recalled, “they disputed every foot of ground—bravely”. (13)
Seeing that he could do nothing
else on the left flank, he rode back around the swamp to see how his right
flank was rallying. Cleburne found about half of
the 23rd Tennessee and about 60 men
from the 6th Mississippi
were ready to fight; about 200 total. Cleburne
lined them up, and ordered the advance.
For a third time, Sherman saw Pat
Cleburne’s men advance. By now, they believed that they faced “a general
assault by the Rebel army”. Wood’s Brigade was steadily turning their left
flank and again these same troops were advancing to their front. Screaming the
Rebel Yell, Cleburne’s
thin and bloodied line arose in unison from the ravine, which was now covered
by the fallen, pushed back the Federal defenders, wavered as the mighty guns
were fired into their ranks at point-blank-range, and finally clashed in
hand-to-hand combat with the gunners. J. A. Wheeler recalled:
I cannot close this
article without saying that the men of this battery were the bravest men we
ever had to deal with. They were worthy of our steel, not one of them
surrendered with a whole hide. They had been in the United States service for twenty
years…If this should fall into the hands of any soldier, on either side in this
charge, I would be glad to correspond with him.
Cleburne ordered his two
shattered regiments to the rear to rest and reform and rode back around to the
rest of his brigade. (14)
While in route, he ran into
General Hardee. Cleburne
wrote: “I reported my situation to him. He ordered me to collect and bring into
the fight a large body of stragglers who were thronging the encampments in our
rear. This, after great exertion, I partially succeeded in doing, but finding
this kind of a force would not stand anything like a heavy fire, I determined
to rejoin my own command on the left, which I did about 2 p.m.” Grant composed
a hurried note and sent it to Buell in Savannah
requesting him to enter the field, as it would “possibly save the day.”
However, whereas the Confederates’ center and right wing pushed ahead steadily,
bending Grant’s left flank, the Confederates’ left was outnumbered nearly two
to one. (15)
Cleburne
found the 5th and 24th Tennessee
and the 15th Arkansas
halted under a hill. The 2nd Tennessee
had suffered so severely during the morning charge that it had moved back to
reform. Once again, Cleburne
ordered the advance. “After moving forward about half a mile I was fired on by
the enemy again, my skirmishers driven in, and soon my main body (the Fifteenth
Arkansas excepted) was heavily engaged. This engagement lasted half an hour,
when the enemy gave way.” Cleburne
had to decide what to do. His first instinct was to pursue the fleeing
Federals. However, his men were out of ammunition and were badly reduced during
the day’s fighting. “Owing to the nature of the ground my ammunition wagons
could not follow, so I had to send a strong fatigue party back, and the men
carried boxes of ammunition on their shoulders up and down the steep hills for
more than a mile.” (16)
Earlier that morning, Federal
divisions under Wallace and Prentiss had taken cover in a sunken road. This
place, later called the Hornet’s Nest, was supported by artillery that covered
the only area of assailment. Ever since 10:30, they had held the area, and the
Confederates knew they had to dislodge the guns to take it. Cleburne, with a few of his best shots, went
forward to pick off Prentiss’ gunners while fire from 62 Confederate cannons
finally dislodged the Federal artillery. Several brigades, including the 2nd,
made a simultaneous attack on the Hornet’s Nest and forced Prentiss to
surrender.
Despite this “high water mark”,
the Confederates received a devastating blow. Albert Sidney Johnston had been
wounded leading his men. He was unaware of the wound at that time and bled to
death, becoming the only full-ranking American general to die in battle.
Cleburne’s Brigade continued to advance in the fading daylight until they were halted by
heavy artillery fire from gunboats and field guns. The men took cover during
this barrage, and as soon as it stopped, Cleburne
pushed forward. It was now dusk, and an aid from Johnston’s
successor, General Beauregard told Cleburne
to halt. That night, they bivouacked in one of the enemy’s old camps only 400
yards from Pittsburg Landing. “It rained heavily during the night. Every
fifteen minutes the enemy threw two shells from his gunboats, some of which
burst close around my men, banishing sleep from the eyes of a few, but falling
chiefly among their own wounded, who were strewn thickly between my camp and
the river. History records few instances of more reckless inhumanity than
this.” (17)
“Soon after daylight on Monday morning I
received notice that the enemy were pushing forward and driving in our cavalry
pickets. It now became plain Buell had arrived and we had a fresh army to
fight. In a few moments I received orders from General Hardee to advance on the
Bark road.” Cleburne
must have thought that, if the Confederates had continued to push forward as
dusk fell, they could have easily whipped Grant’s remaining 7,000 effective
fighters, severed the Federal supply line, and ended the battle there. Instead,
“the great battle of the Southwest” would be carried
over into another day. (18)
Cleburne observed that his brigade was “sadly reduced”. Out of 2,700 which he had
carried into the fight on the previous day, only 800 remained. Cleburne wrote, “Two regiments,
the Second Tennessee and Sixth Mississippi, were absent altogether. Hundreds of
my best men were dead or in the hospitals, and, I blush to add, hundreds of
others had run off early in the fight of the day before--some through cowardice
and some loaded with plunder from the Yankee encampments.” (19)
The brigade
continued advancing until it met up with part of Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps. “I formed on the
left of this line, halted, and ordered my men to lie down. I could plainly see
the enemy's line in my front and that it stretched beyond my left as far as the
eye could see. At this time a battery of six guns came up in my rear and
offered its assistance. I think it was the Washington Battery.” (20)
From
the enemy’s direction, Cleburne
could see a large number of troops about a half mile to his left moving through
a neck of woods. Cleburne
took up his field glasses to determine whether they were friend or foe. It
might be Confederates that were falling back to reform. But if they were
Federals, he was in great danger of being outflanked. Through the field
glasses, Cleburne
could not tell because of the woods and the smoke from the battlefield. “Soon a heavy fight commenced in this
direction. I endeavored to discover the character of these troops, but could
not. Finally Colonel Kelly, of your division, rode up, and informed me they
were enemies.” (21)
Cleburne ordered the six gun Washington
Battery to open fire on the Federals. The Federals responded with their own
artillery, and a duel commenced. “An officer now bore me an order from General
Breckinridge to move forward with his line and attack the force in our front. I
sent back word that I was completely without support and outflanked on the left
and would be destroyed if I advanced. I received for answer that the order was
from General Bragg, that it was positive, and I must immediately advance.” (22)
He ordered his now regiment-sized
brigade to advance. They had not gotten far when the Federals to their left
opened fire on them with artillery. Therefore, Cleburne ordered his men into a shallow
depression to await the outcome of the artillery duel. Even here, there was not
complete protection. Some of the men were killed when tree limbs were cut off
by the screaming artillery shells above.
“It soon became apparent that
our artillery was overmatched. It ceased firing, and the whole line of infantry
charged the enemy. There was a very thick undergrowth here of young trees,
which prevented my men from seeing any distance, yet offered them no protection
from the storm of bullets and grape shot that swept through it. I could not see
what was going on to my right or left, but my men were dropping all around
before the fire of an unseen foe.” Despite this storm of bullets, Cleburne was still not
injured. “My brigade was repulsed and almost completely routed in this
unfortunate attack. As far as I know the Fifteenth Arkansas was the only
regiment rallied anywhere near the scene of disaster. In the face of a deadly
fire and an exultant foe the regiment reformed near two abandoned cannons and
fell back in order behind a ridge.” Cleburne
would not forget this needless order which sentenced so many of his men to
death, or the general who gave it. (23)
For the rest of that day, Cleburne tried to rally
stragglers, destroyed supplies that could not be carried off the field, and
gave assistance to the wounded. While he was doing this, Cleburne ran into the captain of independent
cavalry, Avery, and the two rounded up stragglers together. Avery described Cleburne as fiercely
ordering stragglers back to duty, pistol in hand. But when he was giving aid to
a wounded or dying soldier, Avery described the tenderness in Cleburne’s voice and manner.
Although the first day had been all
Confederate, late starts, blunders, the death of a competent general, the
failure to finish Grant off, and the reinforcement by Buell pushed them back
the second day from their hard-won victories to the muddy roads leading back to
Corinth. Cleburne retained his role of securing the retreat until General Hardee
ordered him to Corinth.
“My brigade, including Trigg's and Calvert's batteries, numbered on the morning
of the 6th 2,750 men; out of this number 1,000 were killed and wounded and 32
missing. This was the first battle my men were ever engaged in. They led the
advance of our army on Shiloh and engaged and
repulsed the enemy's cavalry the Friday before the battle. They fought in the
foremost line both days and were never rested or relieved for a moment. They
captured many stands of colors and assisted in the capture of General Prentiss'
Federal brigade on the left.”
Avery
also described the march back to Corinth:
“The rain began to fall, adding the gloom of the disaster. It became heavier
until it grew to a steady pour, and the road was converted into a deep slop and
the way impenetrably dark and we could go only by the occasional flash athwart
the Cimmerian darkness. We fed our horses about nine o’clock, and then resumed
our weary ride to Corinth.
Men and animals were worn out.” In reference to the valor of his men but the
blunders of the high-command, Cleburne said of Shiloh, “It was a battle gallantly won and as stupidly
lost.” Unfortunately, this scenario would replay many times. (24)
Sources
1:
Pat Cleburne, Confederate General: Chapter 5 page
60
2: Pat Cleburne, Confederate General: Chapter 6
page 63
3: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 4 page 66
: Ibid
4: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 4 page 67
: Pat
Cleburne, Confederate General: Chapter 6 page 63
5:
Pat Cleburne, Confederate General: Chapter 6 page 64
6:
With General A. S. Johnston at Shiloh by
Colonel George Tithe Baylor: Confederate Veteran, Vol. VI, No. 1
7:
Cleburne’s report of the battle of Shiloh: O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
8:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
9:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
10:
Confederate Diary of Robert D. Smith: page 12
: O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
11:
Cleburne’s Brigade at Shiloh by J. A. Wheeler, Salado, Texas:
Confederate Veteran: 1894 pg 1
12:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
13:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
: Ibid
: Robert D. Smith: page 13
14:
Confederate Veteran: 1894 pg 1
15: O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
: Pat Cleburne, Confederate General:
Chapter 6 page 67
16:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
: Ibid
17:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
18:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
19:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
20: O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
21:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
22:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
23:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
: Ibid
24:
O.R. Series I, Vol. X, part 1
: Pat Cleburne, Confederate General:
Chapter 6 page 71
: Ibid